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COMMENTARY
REFLECTIONS ON WHEN "WE, THE
PEOPLE" KILL
MICHAEL P. SENG*

INTRODUCTION

The death penalty continues to be under debate. In fact, the
debate occupied most of the twentieth century.1 Now that we have
moved into the twenty-first century, one would hope that the
matter could be put to rest so that deliberation can take place on
more constructive topics, such as how to prevent crime, how to
reconstruct our prison system so that it is not a breeding place for
professional law-breakers, how best to rehabilitate prisoners, and
finally how to eliminate the blighted conditions which produce so
many of our criminals.
The reasons given for the death penalty-deterrence and
retribution-or against the death penalty-the possibility of error,
unequal application, and that it violates contemporary world
standards and is inhumane-have generally not persuaded
partisans on either side. Indeed, it would appear that reason has
been abandoned in the death penalty debate and emotions and
passion have been substituted in its place.
I.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
DETERRENCE AND RETRIBUTION

Deterrence, while often cited as a justification in earlier
debates, has now been universally repudiated as a justification for
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
1. In a famous debate that occurred in 1924 between Judge Alfred J.
Talley of New York and Clarence Darrow, Judge Talley argued that the death
penalty could be justified because it is a deterrent to those who would commit
crime and to vindicate justice. Clarence Darrow argued against capital
punishment. He disputed that it was a deterrent to crime, and he argued that
it was reserved for the poor and the weak, that true guilt is difficult, if not
impossible, for the justice system to determine, and that the death penalty
cheapens life rather than vindicates justice. See generally CLARENCE DARROW
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Chicago Historical Bookworks 1991) (1924)
(containing the transcripts from Darrow's debate with Judge Alfred J. Talley
and Darrow's closing argument in the Loeb-Leopold murder trial).
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the death penalty. No widely accepted statistics or studies have
shown that the death penalty deters crime, and rarely is
deterrence trotted out as a reason for this most drastic of all
remedies for criminal conduct.
Today most proponents of the death penalty base their
opinion either explicitly or implicitly on retribution. To what
extent the State should assume the role of God is questionable
under any definition of the police power. The states may pass
criminal statutes under their general police powers to protect the
public welfare.! The federal government may pass laws to further
any of the ends enumerated in the Constitution, and it may
impose punishments for the violation of those laws to insure
compliance.' But if the penalty does not rationally further the
enforcement of the law, it is questionable that a state or the
federal government can independently assume the divine power to
redeem society by removing evil and restoring the balance that
existed before the crime was committed.
Indeed, the imposition of death may well hamper attempts by
the accused to make atonement. An example is that of Bill
Witherspoon, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death
for the murder of a Chicago police officer.4 After countless stays of
execution, the United States Supreme Court eventually
overturned Witherspoon's sentence' and the Illinois Supreme
Court resentenced him to life imprisonment. During his detention
on death row, Witherspoon counseled countless young men who
were imprisoned in the Cook County Jail. Many of these young
men testified at Witherspoon's parole hearing to the profound
effect he had on their lives. After Witherspoon was eventually
paroled to Detroit, Michigan, he continued to work with exoffenders to deter them from the type of life he had led.
Witherspoon's actions did not serve as satisfaction to the victim's
family and may or may not have atoned for his crime. But if he
indeed influenced even a few young persons to abandon a life of
crime and to become positive members of society, his life served a
purpose. Who, then, can state definitively whether society would
have benefited more from his execution than it did from his
2. The classic exposition on the police powers of the states is Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
3. The classic exposition on the powers of the federal government is
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

4. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 512 (1971).
5. Id. at 523. The Court held that the states could not exclude jurors who
might not impose the death penalty so that the jury would lean towards death.
Id. at 529. However, this decision was later undercut, if not effectively
overturned, by the United States Supreme Court in 1985, when the Court
ruled that jurors whose beliefs would "substantially impair" their ability to
vote for death could be excluded. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429

(1985).
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remaining alive?
Nor does retribution aid the victim or the victim's family.
While some families of murder victims claim that the death
sentence of the perpetrator brings closure, many experts dispute
this assertion.6

II.

ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

A. Mistake and Caprice
The most common arguments advanced against the death
penalty are the possibility of a wrongful conviction for a capital
crime as well as the discriminatory application of capital
punishment against the large number of low-income and minority
persons accused and convicted of capital crimes. Many supporters
of the death penalty appear to be unmoved by even the most
compelling evidence that mistake and caprice are essential
attributes of the machinery of death. Professor Charles Black, in
his essay, Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice and
Mistake, written in 1974, persuasively argued that mistake is
inevitable and that no standards can be devised that will prevent
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.7 Indeed, it was the
presence of arbitrariness that influenced the United States
Supreme Court in 1972 in Furman v. Georgia' to suspend the
imposition of capital punishment under existing statutes.
According to the three swing Justices, capital punishment as then
administered lodged too much discretion in juries and judges.
However, unlike Professor Black, the majority of the Justices in
1976 decided that the system could be fixed and upheld new
statutes passed by many states that attempted to curtail the
unbridled discretion of judges and juries in imposing the penalty of
death.9

6. ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH?: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF EXECUTIONS 197212 (2000). See generally HELEN PREJEAN, C.S.J., DEAD MAN WALKING: AN
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
7. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974).
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, argued that

no matter how administered the death penalty constituted "cruel and unusual
punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 375.
9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Justice Blackmun voted to
uphold the death penalty; however, in one of his last acts before retiring from
the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun conceded that there was no way that
the death penalty could be administered fairly and that it should be found
unconstitutional.
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1146 n.2 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun declared, "From this day forward, I no
longer shall tinker with the machinery of death." Id. at 1145. Today, unlike
in society at large, there is no consistent voice on the United States Supreme
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A more conservative Supreme Court continued to shield the
death penalty from attack during the remaining quarter of the
twentieth century. Executions resumed again in 1983 with the
execution of Gary Gilmore in Utah. In 1987, the Supreme Court,
in McCleskey v. Kemp, rejected an attack based on virtually
unchallenged statistics that the death penalty was more likely to
be imposed in Georgia if the murder victim was black rather than
white.° The Court held that a defendant could not argue that his
sentence was disproportionate simply because other defendants
did not receive the same penalty."
By the century's end, Texas, under Governor, and later
President, George W. Bush, led the way in administering death.
Texas executed forty prisoners in 2000, alone." Nonetheless,
many people have questioned the fairness of the administration of
capital punishment. Too many mistaken convictions have come to
light, particularly because of new DNA testing. In 2000, Governor
George Ryan of Illinois called a moratorium on the imposition of
capital punishment in that state until the machinery of death
could be fixed.
It is questionable, however, whether new
procedures can remove the doubts about the validity of the death
sentence and the caprice under which it is meted out and
administered."
Bush v. Gore1" supports the inferential argument that capital
Court to oppose "the machinery of death."

10. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 279-280 (1987).
11. Id. at 282.
12. A report issued by the Texas Defender Service reports that the Texas
death system is deeply flawed. See generally A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (Oct. 16, 2000), at http://www.

texasdefender.org/study/index.html (providing an index to the various
chapters of the study). It cites to cases where prosecutors deliberately
presented false or misleading evidence or used "scientific evidence" of dubious
reliability.
See id. (discussing convictions by "junk science"), at
http://www.texasdefender.org/study/chapter3.html. The report cited data that
revealed patterns of disparity based on the race or sex of the victim. See id.
(analogizing the disproportionate imposition of the death penalty on
minorities to lynching), at http://www.texasdefender.org/study/chapter4. html.
The reported also criticized Texas for executing persons who were mentally
retarded and for failing to provide the accused with sufficient legal
representation or meaningful appellate review.
See id. at http://www.
texasdefender.org/study/chapter5.html.
13. Concerning Illinois imposition of a moratorium on capital punishment,
see generally GOVERNOR RYAN DECLARES MORATORIUM ON EXECUTIONS,
WILL APPOINT COMMISSION TO REVIEW CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SYSTEM, Jan.
31, 2000 (official press release), available at http://www.state.il.us/gov/
press/00/Jan/morat.html; Wendy Cole, Death Takes a Holiday, Illinois Halts
Executions While Reviewing Mistakes, TIME, Feb. 14, 2000, available at

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/articles/0,3266,38774,00.html.

For an

excellent discussion of the way the death penalty is presently administered,
see LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 42-69.
14. 121 S.Ct. 525 (2000). The Supreme Court obviously cannot limit the
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punishment cannot withstand an equal protection challenge.
Although Bush involved voting rights in a presidential election,
the reasoning, based on the Equal Protection clause, is equally
applicable to a challenge on the fairness of the administration of
capital punishment. The question before the Supreme Court was
whether a state court must ensure that, at a minimum, the
rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental
fairness are satisfied when it has the power to assure uniformity
through a statewide remedy. 5 In Bush, the Florida Supreme
Court ordered a recount of votes with no safeguards that the votes
would be counted the same in different counties. Although the
Supreme Court acknowledged that methods for counting votes are
normally left to the state, it nonetheless held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal
courts the power to intervene if the rights of16 voters are left to
arbitrary and disparate treatment by the state.
While the Fourteenth Amendment does not specifically
protect the right to vote, the right to life is specifically listed in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Certainly, if a state or its courts cannot
arbitrarily dilute or deny a person's right to vote because of the
Equal Protection clause, then human life must also be given equal
protection. Furman v. Georgia'8 and Gregg v. Georgia'"addressed
the discretion exercised by judges and juries, but they did not
address the discretion of prosecutors. In most states, prosecutorial
discretion is virtually unbridled on the question of who to charge
for a crime, what crime to charge, and what penalty to request.
This exercise of discretion can result in wide disparities between
whether accused persons in different jurisdictions in the same
state are forced to defend their lives in capital cases. 0 In addition,
defense services vary significantly depending upon the jurisdiction
where the defendant is charged. Ultimately, state supreme courts
must decide whether a defendant was properly charged, properly
found guilty, and properly sentenced. The failure of state supreme
courts to enunciate "specific standards" to guide the discretion of

precedential value of its decision in Bush by stating that the Court was only

talking about the limited facts of that case. The Court's discussion of the
Equal Protection Clause is clearly premised on principles applicable to equal
protection arguments generally.

15. Id. at 529.
16. Id. at 532-33.
17. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no "State shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV.
18. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
19. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
20. See LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 6, at 107-25 (describing the wide
discrepancies in charging a defendant for a capital crime based on
prosecutorial discretion).
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prosecutors and to also guide the trial judge and their own review
in these cases makes who is put to death a matter subject to
caprice."
After the moratorium on death announced by Governor Ryan
of Illinois, the Illinois Supreme Court instituted some reforms. On
January 22, 2001, the Court proposed minimum standards for
defense attorneys and prosecutors who handle death cases, the
establishment of a Capital Litigation Bar, special training for
judges assigned to death cases, standards relating to the
disclosure of DNA evidence, discovery rules for sentencing
hearings, and revised standards of ethics for prosecutors. 2 These
rules should be very helpful in assisting defendants in capital
cases to secure competent counsel and in preventing some
mistaken convictions. However, the rules still do not address
important questions, especially concerning the discretion exercised
by prosecutors in seeking the death penalty and in negotiating
plea agreements.
When the federal government reinstated the death penalty in
1988, the United States Justice Department instituted a policy
that required United States Attorneys in the federal districts
across the country to submit to the Attorney General for review
and approval in any case where the United States Attorney wished
to seek the death penalty. Beginning in 1995, the Justice
Department instituted what is commonly known as the death
penalty "protocol." United States Attorneys were required to
submit all capital-eligible offenses, whether or not the United
States Attorney intended to seek the death penalty in that case, to
21. Prosecutors may be protected by separation of powers in the exercise of
their discretion over whether to bring charges, against whom to bring charges,
and what charges to bring. See Manduley v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d
140, 143 (Cal. App. 2001) (invalidating, despite the general rule, a special
California proposition that allowed a prosecutor to determine, in his
discretion, what sentencing scheme a court may impose on a juvenile if the
charges are found true). However, separation of powers does not isolate
prosecutors from a charge that they have discriminated in violation of equal
protection. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (holding
that claimant must show that federal prosecutorial policy had a
discriminatory effect and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
allows courts to find a constitutional violation when the discrimination reflects
no policy, but is simply an arbitrary and capricious action).
22. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Rule 3.8 (concerning the special

responsibilities
of
a
prosecutor),
available
at
http://www.illinoisbar.org/CourtRules/Article8/rule38.html.
23. See Steve Mills, Bar Raised for Capital Case Trials, CHI. TRIB., January
23, 2001, §1, at 1. Mills notes that the proposed changes include the following
rules: Ill. S.Ct. R. 43 (Seminars on Capital Cases); Ill. S.Ct. R. 411
(Applicability of Discovery Rules); Ill. S.Ct. R. 412 (Disclosure to Accused); Ill.
S.Ct. R. 416 (Procedures in Capital Cases); Ill. S.Ct. R. 417 (DNA Evidence);
and Ill. S.Ct. Rules 701 & 714 (Capital Litigation Trial Bar).
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a committee of senior Department attorneys, known as the
Attorney General's Review Committee on Capital Cases, which
made an independent recommendation to the Attorney General.
Department policy specifically provided that bias based on
characteristics such as an individual's race/ethnicity must play no
role in the decision to recommend the death penalty. Despite
these procedures, a report issued by the Justice Department on
September 12, 2000, found stark racial and geographic disparities
in the cases recommended for capital punishment.24
Bush v. Gore thus offers sound justification for dismantling
the machinery of death. Rules and regulations promulgated by
courts (as done by the Illinois Supreme Court), by legislatures (as
done in many states immediately after the Supreme Court's
decision in Furman v. Georgia), or by prosecutors (as done by the
United States Department of Justice) can cure some of the
mistakes made in the administration of death, but they are still
only window dressing and do not reach the fundamental injustices
and inequalities inherent in the system. As previously noted,
proponents of the death penalty frequently base their position not
so much on logic and law as on visceral reaction. One cannot
assume that arguments that the death penalty cannot be fairly
administered will be any more persuasive to them now than they
were in the 1970s. Nonetheless, the number of persons bothered
and outraged by the possibility that innocent persons on death row
will be executed appears to be increasing. Therefore, arguments
based on mistake and caprice should not be abandoned and will
inevitably provoke a turnabout in the law.
B. InternationalOpinion
Nearly every civilized country of the world has abolished the
death penalty. China and the United States are the notable
exceptions. Although Article Six of the International Covenant on
Political and Civil Rights allows signature states to impose the
death penalty, it affirms the right to life and provides that the
death penalty shall not be arbitrarily imposed." The Council of
24. See generally THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM-A STATISTICAL
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/
available
(1988-2000),
SURVEY
_dpsurvey-final.pdf.
25. See Int'l Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 6
(providing that the "sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes
committed by persons below eighteen years of age"), available at
Nonetheless, the United
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/accpr.htm.
States Supreme Court has held that the United States Constitution permits a
person under the age of eighteen at the time the offense was committed to be
executed. Sanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that capital
punishment for juvenile offenders is not cruel and unusual punishment). But
see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (prohibiting the

execution of a minor who was fifteen years old when he committed the
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Europe and the Organization of American States require ratifying
states to abolish the death penalty.26 Moreover, 2 the
United
7
Nations has also come out against capital punishment.
Representative of the nations that have abolished the death
penalty through their courts is the Ukraine.28 The Ukraine has
had a particularly troubled history and was the scene of countless
slaughters and executions during the Stalin era.2 9 Although
Ukraine has not been a world leader in protecting human rights in
the past, in 1999, a number of Deputies and Department Heads
filed an action with the Ukraine Constitutional Court to test the
validity of provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The Code
was adopted in 1960 and effected in 1961, and it provided for the
death penalty for certain enumerated crimes.
The constitutional challenge was based on the fact that the
right to life in the Constitution of Ukraine was absolute, even
though the Constitution itself was silent to the application (or nonapplication) of the death penalty. The Constitutional Court looked
at the circumstances of the adoption of the Constitution and held:
Taking somebody's life by the state, as the result of enforcement of
the death penalty as a type of punishment, even within the
provision stated by law, is the annulment of the inalienable right of
the person to life which is inconsistent with the Constitution of
Ukraine."°
The Court also took into consideration that judicial error is
always possible in a death case and incapable of correction once
the sentence is executed along with the defendant. The Court
further noted that the world's-and its own country's-experience
showed that the death penalty was not an effective deterrence to
crime. 1 The Court concluded:
As Ukraine is a social democratic and law-governed state (Article 1

offense).
26. See generally European Convention on Human Rights, Apr. 28, 1983,
Protocol 6 (concerning the abolition of the death penalty), available at

http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Htm/114.htm; Organization of
American States Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to
Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8, 1990, Resolution 1042, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Bisicos/Basic%20Documents/enbas6.htm.
27. Report of the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Preventionof Crime
and Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1 (1981); Second

Optional Protocol Aimed at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (1990) G.A. Res.
44/128, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44ta44r128.htm.
28. On Constitutional Application of the 51 People's Deputies (Death
Penalty Case), No. 1-33/99 (Constitutional Court of the Ukr. 1999) [hereinafter
Death Penalty Case].
29. See PAUL R. MAGOcsI, A HISTORY OF UKRAINE 567-71 (1996)
(discussing the Ukraine in the Soviet state).
30. Death Penalty Case, supra note 28.
31. Id.
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of the Constitution of Ukraine), in which life and health, honor and
dignity, immunity and security of the person are recognized as the
highest social value (Article 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine), the
death penalty as a type of punishment should be considered as
inconsistent with the stated provisions of the Constitution of
Ukraine.32

The Court also found that the death penalty violated Article
Twenty-Eight of the Ukrainian Constitution, which was patterned
after the European Convention of Human Rights. Article Three of
the Convention provides that "nobody shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."" Thus, the
Constitutional Court ultimately held that imposing the death
penalty would thus be inconsistent with Ukraine's joining the
Council of Europe.34
In 1776, when the United States sought its independence
from England, the drafters of the Declaration of Independence
appealed to the "opinions of Mankind."" The United States has
led the world in many areas of the battle for the recognition of
human rights.
The Bill of Rights to the United States
Constitution was the first attempt to put the rights of mankind
together in a charter that was legally enforceable by the Courts.
The United States was a leader in codifying the laws of war in the
nineteenth century. In two world wars, the United States shed
blood for the proclaimed goals of freedom and democracy. The
United States was a leader in prosecuting Nazi and Japanese war
criminals after World War II. It is widely accepted that the
Supreme Court's outlawing of racial segregation beginning in
Brown v. Board of Education" gave the United States credibility
during the Cold War to enlist Third World nations in the fight
against Communism and for Democracy. "A decent respect to the
opinions of mankind"37 also dictates that the United States should
follow the international trend and dismantle its machinery of
death.38
32. Id.

33. UKR. CONST., art. III, available at http://www.brama.com/uagov/
conste.html.
34. Death Penalty Case, supra note 28.
35. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).

36. See Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling
the "separate but equal" doctrine).
37. See generally Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
Mankind, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 215 (1992); James C.N. Paul, The Human

Right to Development: Its Meaning and Importance, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
235

(1992);

Abdullahi

Ahmed

An-Na'Im,

Civil Rights

in

the Islamic

Constitutional Tradition: Shared Ideals and Divergent Regimes, 25 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 267 (1992).

38. Justices on the United States Supreme Court differ in their approach to
looking to international practices to interpret provisions of the United States
Constitution. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988), Justice
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C. Ethical Concerns
Abolishing the machinery of death would eliminate many of
the ethical questions that accompany the legal questions
concerning the status of capital punishment.
What is the
responsibility of each of us-judge, juror, prosecutor, governor,
warden, prison guard, and citizen, whether in favor of or against
the death penalty-when someone is wrongly executed? How does
the state get the right to kill if the People, either individually or
collectively, do not possess the right to kill? Can one delegate
one's guilt to another by washing one's hands of the whole affair
with death? Are defense lawyers, even those opposed to the death
penalty, giving the enforcement of death respectability by
providing a defense to those on death row? On the other hand, can
we leave persons accused of capital crimes without competent
counsel? How can we reconcile our commitment to equal justice
when we see that minorities and other disadvantaged individuals
that society has neglected are among those most frequently put to
death?
None of these are questions that have easy answers,
especially if one concedes that the death penalty, either in
principle or as administered, is unfair. The Germans have not
solved the issue of guilt and responsibility for crimes committed
during the Nazi era.39 Nor have we resolved the issue of guilt and

Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun stated:

The conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to
execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her
offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by
respected professional organizations, by other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
European community.

Id. Justice Stevens further noted that the Court does recognize "the relevance
of the views of the international community in determining whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual." Id. at 280 n.31. However, in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989), Justice Scalia spoke for a majority of the

Court and refused to look beyond the standards held by "modern American
society as a whole":
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are

dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various
amici ... that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant.
While "[t]he practices of other nations, particularly other democracies,
can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our
people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not merely in our
mores, but text permitting, in our Constitution as well,".. . they cannot
serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the
practice is accepted among our people.

Id. at 370 n. 1.
39. See,
e.g.,
DANIEL
JONAH
GOLDHAGEN,
HITLER'S
WILLING
EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996); INGO
MCLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH (1991).
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responsibility for slavery in the United States." (However, one
need not even equate capital punishment with the Nazi horrors or
with slavery to see the problem.) Perhaps it is better to avoid the
evil and wash our hands of it once and for all, rather than confront
these concerns. Most clearly, the problem will not go away simply
because we choose not to confront it.
III. MEANS OF ABOLITION

A number of avenues are open to accomplish the abolition of
the death penalty. The most likely avenue is through legislation.
A number of states have abolished death as a penalty for ordinary
criminal acts. Between 1972 and 1988, the federal government did
not have legislation authorizing the death penalty. The problem
with relying exclusively on legislation is obvious. With fifty-one
different jurisdictions in the United States, the hope of
accomplishing a uniform prohibition will be particularly difficult.
This is particularly true in states like Texas where the machinery
of death is a matter of collective identity and pride.
Another problem with legislation is that legislation is easy to
undo. American public opinion on the subject of death can be very
fickle. Americans are offended when it is disclosed that innocent
people are on death row, such as when persons who have been
sentenced to death are shown by DNA evidence to be unconnected
to the crime. On the other hand, if a mass murderer is captured or
a tragedy like the Oklahoma City bombing occurs, the first
reaction of even the most humane persons is generally in favor of
resurrecting the death penalty. It is certainly more expedient for
politicians to advocate for stricter use of the death penalty than to
come up with real solutions to the problems posed by crime.
A solution could be to draft death penalty legislation that only
applies to mass murders or particularly heinous crimes, but such
an answer raises all the problems that arose after states
attempted to draft legislation to meet the concerns of Furman v.
Georgia.41 Our constitutional experience with free speech and
other fundamental rights demonstrates that sometimes the public
must be protected from itself when passions are aroused.
Thus, a federal constitutional standard is desirable. This can
be achieved in two ways: through a Supreme Court opinion
declaring that the death penalty cannot be administered
consistently with due process and the Eight Amendment's
prohibition against "cruel and inhuman punishment;' 2 or through
a constitutional amendment. Actually, the present Supreme Court

40. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
41. 428 U.S. 238 (1972).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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is ideally situated to accomplish the task of declaring capital
punishment unconstitutional once and for all time. The Court is
activist and not necessarily wedded to any rigid doctrine of
"original intent." It is also pro-government in criminal cases. Its
reputation is such that critics could not easily contend that the
Court is soft on crime if it outlawed capital punishment.
Irrefutable facts coupled with existing precedent in the area of
equal justice could be used to structure an opinion that would
settle the issue.
A constitutional amendment would require politicians to put
away the easy rhetoric they use so successfully at election time to
scare the public into believing that greater harshness will solve
the crime problem. A constitutional amendment would require a
massive effort at public education.
Whether this could be
accomplished without polarizing the nation is questionable. The
money and emotion that is expended whenever gun control
legislation is proposed indicates that a debate over a constitutional
amendment to bar capital punishment could be equally divisive.
The President could negotiate and the Senate could ratify a
treaty or one of the international agreements that proscribe the
machinery of death. A treaty would supersede state laws and any
laws passed by Congress prior to its ratification.43 The President
would take a political risk in leading a charge to bring the United
States into conformity with the rest of the world, but it could and
should be done.
The death penalty cannot be fairly administered. It conflicts
with general civilized standards of behavior, and in most, if not all,
cases, it is inhumane. Politicians, educators, religious leaders, and
judges must aid the public in setting aside many of the prejudices
and myths that support capital punishment and work for its
abolition.
Abolition would allow us to start looking at the
challenge imposed by crime realistically and to come up with real
solutions.44
43. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam) (holding

that a treaty that allowed an alien accused of a crime to contact his embassy
could not be invoked because the petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim).
44. Mandatory life sentences without parole are often proposed as a

substitute for the death penalty.

This substitute serves the objective of

protecting the public from recidivist criminals and, when juries are informed
of this option, they often impose it rather than death. LIFTON & MITCHELL,
supra note 6, at 154-56. It is indicative of the lag in thinking about
criminology in the United States that little debate is raised about the legality
and morality of the life without parole option.
The issue was seriously debated in Germany and resulted in a major decision
by the German Constitutional Court. Life Imprisonment Case, 45 BVerfGE
187 (1997), reprinted in DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 306-11 (1997).

A

criminal conviction for a drug-related murder resulted in a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment. Id. at 312. The German Constitutional Court
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noted that when the legality of the death penalty was debated in Germany in
the 1960s, advocates of capital punishment argued that life imprisonment was
a more cruel and inhuman punishment than the death penalty. The Court
noted that the German Constitution protects and respects human dignity and
that current attitudes were important in understanding the content, function,
and effect of the basic rights in the Constitution. Id. at 308. The Court stated
that:
Every punishment must justly relate to the severity of the offense and
the guilt of the offender. Respect for human dignity especially requires
the prohibition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishments. [The
state] cannot turn the offender into an object of crime prevention to the
detriment of his constitutionally protected right to social worth and
respect.
Id. Consistent with this constitutional requirement, the Court continued:
A sentence of life imprisonment must be supplemented, as is
constitutionally required, by meaningful treatment of the prisoner.
Regarding those prisoners under life sentences, prisons also have the
duty to strive toward their resocialization, to preserve their ability to
cope with life and to counteract the negative effects of incarceration and
the destructive changes in personality that accompany imprisonment.
Id. The Court further commented that the state must do all in its power to
facilitate the prisoner's reentry into society. Nonetheless, the Court held that
life imprisonment for a murder of wanton cruelty is not senseless or
disproportionate, but the judge must retain "some discretion in imposing a
penalty that conforms to the constitutional principle of proportionality." Id. at
310.
Later, in the War Criminal Case, 72 BVerfGE 105 (1986), the Constitutional
Court held that a sentencing court should not place "too heavy an emphasis on
the gravity of the crime as opposed to the personality, state of mind, and age of
the offender," and that "every offender sentenced to life imprisonment,
whatever the nature of his crime, must be allowed to live in the realistic hope
of regaining his freedom." Id. at 312.

